The global response to a catastrophic shock to productivity which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption. Our multi-region model of growth and climate change indicates that without international lump-sum transfers the cooperative global response to such stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions. Non-cooperative responses lead to a bit more precautionary saving and lower diverging carbon taxes. Precautionary capital suffers less from international free-rider problems than the carbon taxes. We illustrate the various outcomes with a calibrated North-South model of the global economy.
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Introduction
The standard recipe for the fight against global warming is to have a global carbon tax which has to be set equal to the present value of all future marginal damages arising from emitting one ton of carbon (e.g., Tol, 2002; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007; Golosov et al., 2014) . Although these integrated assessment studies acknowledge catastrophic non-marginal damages from global warming, they typically allow for them by having convex damages. Here we focus at the consequences for climate policy of a pending non-marginal calamity which becomes more imminent with global warming (cf., Cai et al., 2012; Lemoine and Traeger, 2014; Lontzek et al., 2014) .
1 Policy makers need to react in two ways to such catastrophes (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2014 ):
global carbon taxation or a global emissions market to curb the risk of climate calamities; and precautionary capital accumulation (ensured with a capital subsidy if the market fails to internalize the need for precautionary capital) to cope with the inevitable downward drop in consumption after the calamity.
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It is well known that international pollution control is subject to substantial free-rider problems. If the stock of pollution causes damage, non-cooperative differential game theory indicates that lack of international policy cooperation leads to excessively large pollution stocks (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992) . Such international free-rider problems occur with vengeance in the fight against global warming. Although multi-country versions of climate assessment models such as RICE have been used to highlight the different incentives to fight global warming in the different blocks of countries (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Hassler and Krusell, 2012) , dynamic game theory 1 These large, abrupt and persistent changes in the climate system are called regime shifts in the ecological literature and a point where such a regime shift occurs is called a tipping point (e.g. Biggs et al., 2012) . Scientists have indeed given more prominence to the idea that climate policy should focus at the small risk of abrupt and often irreversible climate disasters and tipping points at high temperatures rather than at smooth global warming damages at low and moderate temperatures (e.g., Lenton and Ciscar, 2013; Kopits et al., 2013; Pindyck, 2013) .
2 is typically not used to assess the costs of free riding on international negotiations. Furthermore, most of these studies focus only on carbon stocks as international common bads and ignore other spill-over effects to do with international trade in goods and services, migration and capital flows, insurance and intertemporal trade.
Our contribution is to reinvestigate non-cooperative and cooperative responses to the prospect of non-marginal climate catastrophes leading to a sudden and irreversible drop in total factor productivity. 3 The only connection between regions is that carbon emissions in each region affect the common stock of carbon in the atmosphere or global warming and thus the hazard of climate tipping. We thus also abstract from international and intertemporal trade. 4 We do allow for two crucial asymmetries by, on the one hand, distinguishing between a developed region with a high initial capital stock and a developing region with a low initial capital stock, and, on the other hand, allowing the size of the climate disaster to be bigger for the developing region than for the developed region. Here a broad measure of capital, including human capital and institutional quality, is taken.
Although international lump-sum transfers can in principle ensure smoothing of consumption and a common carbon tax across the globe (Chichilniski and Heal, 1994) , this is hard to achieve in international negotiations. Our approach focuses on internalizing the transboundary externalities of carbon emissions that increase the hazard of climate change affecting everyone. Our main focus is thus on cooperation in the setting of carbon taxes in the absence of international transfers. Non-cooperative outcomes assume, in addition to such transfers being infeasible, that transboundary externalities are not internalized.
Our approach is a novel type of differential game where the strategic 3 interactions take place via the carbon emissions of each region affecting the common hazard of a climate catastrophe.
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Our core results are as follows. First, if international transfers are feasible, international cooperation gives the first best with international consumption smoothing and a common carbon tax throughout the globe to curb global emissions and the probability of a regime shift. Furthermore, additional precautionary capital is accumulated before the calamity to be better prepared for when the calamity strikes and not suffer a too big a blow to consumption.
Second, if international transfers are infeasible, which seems to be more realistic as we do not observe consumption smoothing across the rich and poor parts of the globe, international cooperation can still aim for internalizing the transboundary externalities of carbon emissions. Less developed regions give higher priority to consumption, so have a lower carbon tax in the short run than the developed regions of the world economy. Since the climate calamities hit developing regions more, they have to engage more in precautionary capital accumulation. Third, in the absence of any international cooperation, there will be on average a lower carbon tax leading to more global warming and a more imminent climate catastrophe. There is an absence of free-rider problems in precautionary capital accumulation, but the bigger hazards of a calamity under non-cooperation necessitate more precautionary capital accumulation. The real cost of non-cooperative climate policies is that the hazard of a climate calamity is brought forward. To the extent that this is an irreversible catastrophe, the costs will be significant.
Section 2 presents our multi-region model of growth and development with tipping points and abundant fossil fuel. Section 3 discusses what the outcomes are after tipping has occurred, both with and without international lump-sum transfers. Section 4 derives the outcomes under international policy 4 cooperation if transfers are unavailable and compares these with the first-best responses with transfers. Section 5 derives the non-cooperative outcomes for climate policy and shows that these are less ambitious than under international policy cooperation. Section 6 compares the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes with the first best and business-as-usual scenarios using a calibrated North-South model of the global economy. Section 7 concludes.
A multi-region growth model with climate tipping
Consider a continuous-time Ramsey model of growth and global warming for the global economy. We distinguish regions i = 1,..., n which are unconnected by international trade, migration or capital flows. Subscripts i denote the different regions. The only thing that connects these countries is a common concern for global warming for the planet. This concern stems from a higher stock of greenhouse gases bringing forward the expected date of a climate catastrophe. In the calibration we consider two possible asymmetries between a developing and a developed region (i = 2), namely different stages of economic development, proxied by different levels of initial capital stocks, 12 (0) (0) 0, KK  and different levels of damages to total factor productivity as developing regions suffer relatively more from global warming, denoted by 21 0   (see below), where region 1 denotes the developed and region 2 the developing region.
Fossil fuel E i is an input into the production process and has constant marginal cost d > 0. We assume that fossil fuel is in abundant supply (think of coal or shale gas). 6 The capital stock is denoted by K i for region i. We assume that capital and fossil fuel are cooperative factors of production. Total factor 5 Before-tip strategic interactions affecting the hazard of being removed from office have been analysed in the context of dynamic resource games before (van der Ploeg, 2012) . 6 In the background there may also a carbon-free imperfect substitute for fossil fuel, renewable energy, which is produced with constant marginal cost. However, we suppress this and assume this is optimized as in van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2014 The use of fossil fuels (measured in GtC) in each of the regions leads to emissions of carbon dioxide. We denote the fraction of carbon emissions that does not return quickly to the surface of the earth by ψ > 0. About a fifth of emissions remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years (Golosov et al., 2014; Gerlagh and Liski, 2012 ), but we suppose that all of the stock of atmospheric carbon P decays at the rate γ > 0 (roughly 1/300) eventually and returns to the surface of the earth. Fossil fuel use in all regions contribute to an increase in the stock P and thus to global warming and a higher risk of climate tipping. To formalize this, we suppose that a bigger stock of carbon P increases the probability of climate change, hence
HP . The size of the potential drop in total factor productivity is thus known but it is not known when the climate regime shift will take place. With global warming the expected duration before the regime shift occurs, 1/ ( ), HP falls with time, so failing climate policy makes the shock to productivity more imminent. The conditional chance of the tip occurring at time T is
 is the probability that the tip takes place in the infinitesimally small interval of time between t and t + Δt,
given that it has not occurred before t.
Although we do not allow for international lump-sum transfers when we derive our cooperative and non-cooperative responses to the threat of climate catastrophe, the first best does allow for such transfers (typically, from the 6 developing to the developed regions). Such transfers ensure that consumption will be smoothed and lead to a uniform carbon tax across the globe. These transfers may be desirable from a global welfare perspective but they are hard if not impossible to realise in international negotiations. We therefore abstract from them when we consider our second-best cooperative and non-cooperative responses to the threat of abrupt climate calamities.
Social welfare in each of the regions is defined as the expected present discounted value of the utility of the consumption:
Capital accumulation in each of the regions is given by
, 1,.. ,
with total factor productivity in each of the regions given by
where the tipping point T is driven by the hazard rate () HPwith the accumulation of the atmospheric stock of carbon given by
.
We focus on and compare the following outcomes for the global economy:
1. Cooperative responses when global welfare is maximized.
2. Non-cooperative responses when each region maximizes its own welfare taking the actions of the other region at any point of time as given (Nash equilibrium).
3. Business-as-usual scenario where in contrast to the previous three outcomes the regions behave in a naïve fashion and do not take account of threat of catastrophic climate catastrophes.
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None of these outcomes allow for international transfers and international consumption smoothing. If one does and allows for international cooperation one would obtain the first best (see appendix 1). These cooperative and noncooperative outcomes are second best and focus only on the transboundary externalities of carbon emissions raising the hazard of climate change. Section 6 illustrates these outcomes numerically with a stylized calibrated two-region model of growth and development for the global economy.
After-tip outcomes
After the climate catastrophe has occurred, each region i independently solves a standard Ramsey growth problem with total factor productivity (1 )
does not matter whether regions cooperate or not after the tip, but it does matter whether international transfers are available.
The maximum levels of output net of energy costs and capital depreciation are
Fossil fuel use increases with the capital stock K i and decreases in the size of the disaster  i and the price, so
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations in the value function V A are
where superscript A denotes after-tip values. The optimality condition for consumption implies that marginal utility of consumption should equal the marginal value of capital, '( ) ( , ), Differentiating (6) with respect to K i and using (7) yields
where  is the uniform elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Relative risk aversion and intergenerational inequality aversion equal 1/. Equation (8) yields the Keynes-Ramsey rule and the dynamics of capital:
We denote the steady state with a bar across the variable. The steady-state capital stocks ()
.., , in  and are low if the region-specific disaster is large and the discount rate is high. As far as the transient phase is concerned, the capital stock is predetermined at time T, but the rate of consumption jumps down at the time of the tip to place the economy on the stable manifold,
The optimal path along the stable manifold is
where we use (cf. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2014):
Before-tip cooperative outcomes
The question is how the prospect of a climate regime shift affects the optimal growth paths before this shift occurs. Since the hazard rate H(P) of a climate disaster depends on the stock of atmospheric carbon P, the value functions ( , , ), 1,.., , 
International cooperation: no international transfers
With no transfers, 0, 1,.., ,
the world social planner maximizes expected utilitarian global social welfare taking account of how an imminent stochastic tipping point affects the optimal growth path. It thus solves: (5) and the after-tip value function (10). Optimal control problems with an endogenous hazard rate can be solved via a HJB equation including a term that captures the expected capitalized losses from a climate disaster (cf. Polasky et al., 2011; van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2014) . If the regions cooperate, we find that we can write the global value function in the separable form
where the superscript C 10 denotes the cooperative before-calamity outcome. We denote ( , ) A ii VK  from (11) 
with the optimality conditions
With τ i C as the additional cost of fossil fuel input, we define Y i B as maximum output net of fossil fuel costs and capital depreciation:
Differentiating (12) with respect to K i and P, using (13)- (14), yields a set of differential equations for the first-order derivatives of B i V as functions of time (the Pontryagin conditions). This leads to (omitting the dependence on time t):
From the first part of (15) using (13), we get the Keynes-Ramsey rule:
 is the precautionary return on capital accumulation and
 is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The 11 growth rate of consumption is thus proportional to the marginal net product of capital plus the precautionary return minus the pure rate of time preference.
The precautionary return on capital is proportional to the hazard of a climate calamity and through this channel increases with global warming and the stock of atmospheric carbon. This precautionary return, if necessary forced upon the market by a capital subsidy, induces precautionary capital accumulation and softens the blow to consumption when the calamity strikes.
Using (14) and (13), we get the dynamics for the social costs of carbon:
We thus have that the social costs of carbon under international cooperation are the present discounted value of expected non-marginal damages from a calamity to all regions together:
The relevant discount rate is the sum of the interest rate plus the rate of atmospheric decay, the hazard of a climate calamity and the precautionary return. Hence, the optimal carbon tax is large if the drops in future welfare from climate calamities and the marginal hazard are large. The convexity of the hazard pushes up the carbon tax; the level of the hazard depresses it (via the higher discount rate).
Due to the infeasibility of international transfers, it is not optimal to equalize carbon taxes across the globe. Poorer regions have lower levels of consumption and therefore have a higher marginal utility of consumption.
They also have a lower capital stock and thus a higher marginal product of 12 capital and employ a higher discount rate. As can be seen from (18), both of these effects imply that it is optimal from a global perspective for poorer regions to have a lower carbon tax than richer regions in the short run but the carbon taxes will converge throughout the globe in the long run. In as far as poorer countries suffer more from the impact of climate calamities than richer countries, (16) indicates that the precautionary return or the required capital subsidy and thus the degree of precautionary capital accumulation must be higher for poorer countries. This offsets somewhat the downward effect on the socially optimal carbon taxes to be set for poorer countries.
The equations for the pre-tip accumulation of capital and carbon are:
0 .
The second terms in the right-hand side of the capital dynamics, the first part of (19), are the lump-sum rebates of the tax revenues if the social costs of carbon τ are implemented as a carbon tax.
The steady state and transient pre-tip dynamics under international cooperation follow from solving the saddle-point system (16), (17) 
The Nash equilibrium characterized by (20) implies that each region focuses on their own growth path, taking emissions of the other regions as given and ignoring the transboundary externality.
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium optimality conditions for problem (19) become:
, , 1,...., , (14)).
As before, differentiating (20) with respect to K i and P yields the Pontryagin conditions for the non-cooperative outcome:
As other regions' fossil fuel use, E i , does not depend on K i , (15b) is unaffected by these cross terms. E i does depend on  i and this explains why the value functions V i in (15a) and (15b) depend on  i . Since we focus at an open-loop Nash equilibrium in feedback representation which takes the time paths of fossil fuel use and emissions paths of the other regions as given, we do not need extra terms in (15a) and (15b) to allow for the effects of  i and K i and P via E i on V i . This is why the value functions for each region simply depend on their own capital stock and the stock of atmospheric carbon.
The conditions (15) are the same as (15) for the cooperative case except for the social costs of carbon. If the regions cooperate, they internalize the externality of putting the other regions to higher risk from increasing the stock of atmospheric carbon and thus employ a higher social cost of carbon as can be seen by comparing the expression for From the first part of (17) and (15), we get the Keynes-Ramsey rules
not easy to characterize these other equilibria.
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which are the same as the Keynes-Ramsey rules under international cooperation (16) except that the non-cooperative taxes determine energy demand and the level of net output. Comparing (16) and (16), we see that in contrast to the expressions for the carbon taxes there is no non-cooperative bias in the expressions for the precautionary returns on capital accumulation.
The reason is that the international externality plays out via global warming. In general equilibrium, however, the non-cooperative level of global warming will be higher. The non-cooperative precautionary returns or capital subsidies will therefore be higher than under international cooperation in general equilibrium. The precautionary returns are also affected by the percentage drop in consumption after the tip, but that should not differ too much for cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes.
Using (15) and (13), we get the dynamics of the social costs of carbon: 
Hence, comparing (18) with (18), we establish that for the symmetric noncooperative outcome the expressions for the non-cooperative optimal carbon taxes are half that of those for the cooperative carbon taxes. Of course, as the rate of consumption and capital and carbon stocks differ for the noncooperative and cooperative outcomes, this does not necessarily mean that the carbon taxes are half those in the non-cooperative outcome. For example, the carbon stock and global warming will be higher if countries do not cooperate. 16 Hence, to the extent that the hazard function is convex this puts some upward pressure on the non-cooperative carbon taxes. On the other hand, the higher damages in the absence of cooperation depress rates of consumption and boost marginal utilities of consumption, thus pushing non-cooperative carbon taxes further downwards. How these and other effects play out will be manifest in the numerical illustrations for the global economy (see section 6).
The equations for the accumulation of capital and greenhouse gases are:
which are the same as (19) except that the social costs of carbon and thus the rates of output and fossil fuel use are set to their non-cooperative levels.
The steady state and transient pre-tip non-cooperative dynamics follow from the saddle-point system (16), (17) and (19), with the same predetermined and non-predetermined variables as in section 4.1.
Comparison of steady states
The steady states follow from the modified golden rules of capital
in the cooperative case, and
in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with
This is only a target steady state, because after the tip the system will move to the after-tip steady states . general equilibrium effects, the cooperative costs of carbon are n times the average of the non-cooperative costs of carbon but the precautionary returns are the same in the two cases. However, with higher carbon taxes the stock of atmospheric carbon is kept lower so that the risk of a climate disaster is lower and less precautionary saving is needed. Therefore, it is to be expected that the precautionary returns are lower in the cooperative case than in the Nash equilibrium. In the simulations in the next section we quantify these effects.
Illustrative calculations for a North-South model of the global economy
Here we calculate numerically the outcomes derived in sections 3-5 for a stylized North-South model of the global economy of which the calibration is 18 based on van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2014) and discussed in appendix 2.
Region 1 is the developed region (the "North") and starts out with an initial capital stock which is 9 times larger than that of region 2 (the "South"). We assume the same total factor productivity and a relatively high capital share.
This captures that institutions themselves evolve over time as the economy develops and institutional quality is therefore subsumed in the capital stocks of each region. Human capital to the extent that it develops by investments is also included in this broad measure of capital. The other key asymmetry is that we assume catastrophic drops of 10 and 30 percent in total factor productivity for, respectively, the North and South, i.e.,  1 = 0.1 and  2 = 0.3.
We suppose that at the initial carbon stock, P 0 = 826 GtC (or 388 ppm by vol. CO2), the hazard rate is H (826) We first discuss the steady-state outcomes and then the transient paths of the cooperative, non-cooperative and business-as-usual (BAU) outcomes.
Steady-state outcomes
The business-as-usual and the after-tip scenarios with and without international transfers have zero carbon taxes and no precautionary savings
and give rise to the steady states reported in table 1. As a result of the tip we see that capital, economic activity and consumption are lower, especially in the South where the calamity strikes hardest. As a result, there will be less carbon emissions and thus the carbon stock will be considerable lower after the tip (1414 instead of 1992 GtC). Consequently, global warming will be less after the tip (3.7 instead of 5.2 degrees Celsius).
As a comparison, we also give the results in case the calamity hits all parts of the world in the same way (final column). respectively. These are used to evaluate the after-tip value functions, which are needed to calculate the cooperative and non-cooperative pre-tip steady states reported in table 2. We make the following observations. Finally, if the impact of the climate calamity is the same for North and South, the last two columns indicate that the non-cooperative carbon taxes are a bit less than half of the cooperative taxes but that long-run non-cooperative and cooperative precautionary returns do not vary much. This is a result of the non-cooperative bias mainly manifesting itself in the carbon taxes, not in the precautionary returns.
Transient dynamics
Of course, just comparing the steady-state effects of our prudent outcomes for the two regions with business as usual can be very misleading, especially in the presence of asymmetries. For example, the prudent pre-tip steady states 
  )
10 The outcomes are calculated by log-linearizing the relevant saddle-point system and solving 23 for the dynamic trajectories using spectral decomposition.
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We make the following observations.
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First, the South has to catch up with the North so that consumption is in the beginning substantially lower in the South. If tipping does not occur for a long time, the consumption levels converge close together in all cases. In the long run, the business-as-usual, cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes lead to approximately the same levels of consumption.
Second, the capital stock and economic activity in the South start low but if tipping does not occur for a long time, the capital stock in the South will eventually be larger than the capital stock in the North. After all, the South has to prepare for a larger climate catastrophe. Both capital stocks are always higher than in the business-as-usual outcome if tipping can occur. In the noncooperative outcome, the capital stocks in both the North and the South are slightly larger than under cooperation. The reason is that the hazard rate is a bit higher under non-cooperation, since the stock of atmospheric carbon and risk of catastrophe are a bit higher, and thus precautionary saving must rise. 
Conclusion
Future costs of global warming may to a large extent result from climate tipping points (Lenton and Ciscar, 2013) . The catastrophic damages as such 26 are an important driver of the carbon tax. Another important driver is how much more imminent the tipping point becomes with global warming. The most striking result in analysing these tipping points is that both precautionary capital accumulation and a carbon tax are needed. Precautionary saving may be picked up by the market but if not, a capital subsidy is needed. More capital is required to be prepared for the shock and to smooth consumption over time and less fossil fuel use is required to curb the risk of a tipping point.
With full international cooperation and the developed region transferring funds to the developing region to smooth consumption across the globe, the first best will result. This will lead to the same carbon tax for all parts of the global economy. This first-best outcome is highly unrealistic as such international transfers are, in practice, never used to fully smooth consumption across the globe. However, without such transfers countries may be willing to aim for the second-best global optimum where the transboundary externalities of carbon emissions leading to a higher carbon stock and therefore a higher hazard of a climate catastrophe are internalized. In this case carbon taxes will be higher in the developed than in the developing parts of the world economy, as poorer countries need to catch up with the rich countries, but will converge in the long run if tipping does not occur for a long time. If countries do not coordinate and cooperate on their climate policies, the outcome will be third best. In this case, carbon taxes are lower, of course, and also diverge instead of converge in the long run. As a consequence, fossil fuel use and thus the carbon stock and the hazard rate are higher, and consequently global warming will be more severe. It follows that precautionary saving is higher if the countries do not cooperate, even though there are no direct externalities with respect to the accumulation of the capital stocks. Since poorer countries suffer relatively more from climate calamities, they need to engage more in precautionary capital accumulation.
We envisage four future directions of research. First, following van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2014) one can allow for more conventional gradual, marginal 27 global warming damages in addition to the damages resulting from stochastic tipping points. Second, one can allow for catastrophic shocks to the carbon cycle instead of total factor productivity as in van der . Third, one can allow for the scarcity of fossil fuel and the scarcity rents that this implies. Engström and Gars (2014) have investigated similar issues in the tractable discrete-time aggregate model of global growth and climate change developed by Golosov et al. (2014) . It is important to see how this plays out in a multiregion world. 11 Fourth, our two-region model of the global economy is highly stylized and designed for illustrative purposes. With a greater fragmentation of regions the non-cooperative biases in carbon taxes will be higher. It is also important to study how the various cooperative and non-cooperative models play out with international trade and capital mobility. Finally, one might investigate the international political economy of dealing with tipping points that affect different parts of the globe differently. Using international lump-sum transfers achieves international consumption smoothing despite differences in stages of economic development. Hence, the first-best carbon taxes are the same across the globe too (cf. Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994) . In fact, the precautionary returns, social rates of interest and capital stocks are the same throughout the globe. 
